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a b s t r a c t
Consumers’ choices are typically influenced by the choice context in ways that standard models cannot
explain.We provide a concise explanation of the attraction, compromise and similarity effects. Themodel,
Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling (MADS), posits that the evaluation of a choice option is based on
its relative position in the market distribution as first inferred and then sampled by the decision-maker.
The inferred market distribution is assumed to be systematically influenced by the choice options. The
value of a choice option is assumed to be determined by the number of sampled comparators that the
option dominates. We specify conditions on the sampling distribution that are sufficient for MADS to
predict the three context effects. We tested the model using a novel experimental design with 1200
online participants. In the first experiment, prior to making a choice participants were shown a selection
ofmarket options designed to change their beliefs about themarket distribution. Participants’ subsequent
choices were affected as predicted. The effect was strong enough to impact the size of two of the
three classic context effects significantly. In the second experiment, we elicited individuals’ estimates of
distributions of market options and found the estimates to be systematically influenced by the choice set
as predicted by themodel. It is concluded thatMADS, amodel based on simple binary ordinal comparisons,
is sufficient to account for the three classic context effects.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
A well-established challenge to the standard utility model is
given by the existence of context effects in consumer choice. Con-
text effects occur when the relative frequency with which one
option is chosen over another depends on the other options in
the choice set. In this paper we consider the three most-studied
context effects found in multi-attribute choice experiments: the
similarity effect (Tversky, 1972), the attraction effect (Huber,
Payne, & Puto, 1982) and the compromise effect (Simonson, 1989).
* Correspondence to: Department of Economics and Nuffield College, University
of Oxford, 1 New Road, Oxford, OX1 1NF, United Kingdom.
E-mail address: david.ronayne@economics.ox.ac.uk (D. Ronayne).
We illustrate the three context effects in Fig. 1 which shows
choice options located within price × quality space. Consider the
low-quality, low-price option A, and the high-quality, high-price
option B. The attraction effect occurs when one of two options is
more likely to be chosen after a third option that it, and only it,
dominates is introduced, e.g., p(A|{A, B, TA}) > p(A|{A, B, TB}). The
compromise effect occurs when an option is more likely to be cho-
sen when it becomes an intermediate option, e.g., p(B|{A, B, CB}) >
p(B|{A, B, CA}). The similarity effect occurs when the introduc-
tion of a third option that is similar to one of the alternatives
increases the probability of choosing the dissimilar alternative,
e.g., p(A|{A, B, SA}) > p(A|{A, B, SB}).1
1 In the first papers to document the context effects, choices from binary choice
sets were compared against those from ternary sets in order to serve as examples
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2017.08.005
0022-2496/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Fig. 1. Context effects. Example alternatives which form the choice sets used
to demonstrate the attraction, compromise and similarity effects. Hollow dots
represent the various decoys that join A and B to make up ternary context-effect
choice sets.
These three context effects have been replicated many times in
a variety of domains (e.g., Doyle, O’Connor, Reynolds, & Bottomley,
1999; Huber et al., 1982), and within a single study (Berkow-
itsch, Scheibehenne, & Rieskamp, 2014; Noguchi & Stewart, 2014).
Moreover, the fit of discrete-choice models can be improved by
adding estimable parameters for each context effect and some of
their interactions (Rooderkerk, Van Heerde, & Bijmolt, 2011). The
classical utility paradigm built on the assumption of rational pref-
erence orderings renders choice invariant to the introduction of
seemingly irrelevant alternatives, and hence is not able to explain
these phenomena without substantial modification.
In this paper we offer a concise account based on a simple
cognitive mechanism, binary ordinal comparison, which is mo-
tivated by a large body of independent psychological evidence.
We term themodel Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling (MADS).
It contrasts with previous accounts provided in both economics
and psychology. For example, it has been shown that the com-
promise effect can result as equilibrium behavior in markets un-
der uncertainty where the choice set provides information for
the decision-maker (e.g., Kamenica, 2008; Wernerfelt, 1995).
However, these accounts of context effects do not explain well
why the effects are found in domains where it is less plausible
that the options carry information regarding decision-relevant
attributes such as quality (e.g., consumer choices over gifts of
coupons and cash: Tversky & Simonson, 1993; or choices over lot-
teries: Wedell, 1991). Furthermore, Trueblood et al. (2013) show
that the ‘big three’ context effects appear when individuals judge
psychophysical stimuli, suggesting that the mechanism underly-
ing the effects is a more fundamental component of the human
decision-making process. In economics, existing accounts of some
of the effects have been based on psychological factors such as
dimensional weighting (Bushong, Rabin, & Schwartzstein, 2015),
salience (Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2013), limited attention
(Manzini & Mariotti, 2014; Masatlioglu, Nakajima, & Ozbay, 2012)
of violations of the regularity principle. In studies since, it has been common to
define the context effects via comparisons of the probability of an alternative being
chosen from two ternary choice sets (see Table 1 of Trueblood, Brown, Heathcote,
& Busemeyer, 2013). Throughout this paper, we also define context effects via
comparisons of an alternative’s choice probabilities from ternary choice sets.
and reference points (Ok, Ortoleva, & Riella, 2015). Some have
also been predicted by the solution to an intra-personal bargaining
problem (de Clippel & Eliaz, 2012).
In psychology, there are models of choice that account for
all three of the major context effects (e.g., Bhatia, 2013; Roe,
Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001; Trueblood, Brown, & Heathcote,
2014; Usher & McClelland, 2004). However, none capture the
three effects with one psychological mechanism, instead resorting
to arguably ad-hoc parametrizations. Furthermore, most of these
models are complex and can only be estimated numerically. In
contrast, we offer a novel account of the three consumer choice
context effects based on sampling and binary ordinal comparison,
while maintaining analytic expressibility. Our argument is one of
sufficiency, not necessity: We suggest that simple binary domi-
nance relations, combined with an assumption that samples are
drawn from a distribution that is influenced by the choice set, are
all that is needed to account for the three context effects.We do not
present data that exclude more complex accounts (e.g., accounts
based on better-than-ordinal dominance relations).
Our model instantiates three key assumptions. The first as-
sumption is that individuals evaluate choice options by comparing
them to a limited sample of other items. The idea that judg-
ments and choices are based on a process of sampling comparator
items from memory and/or the immediate choice environment
is ubiquitous in psychology (e.g. Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler & Juslin,
2006; Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010) and is strongly supported by the
existence of context effects of the type discussed in the present
paper. Related ideas are found in several recent economic models
(e.g., Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2012a, 2013; Gennaioli &
Shleifer, 2010; Kőszegi & Szeidl, 2013) and neuroscience (Born-
stein, Khaw, Shohamy, & Daw, 2017; Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016).
The second assumption is that the sampling process is system-
atically influenced by the choice set.We assume that a given choice
set will be taken by subjects to suggest the presence of unobserved
market options which the subject may therefore include in the
sample they generate. More specifically, in our model people be-
have as if they infer a distribution over the whole marketplace
of options on the basis of the choice set that they face, and sam-
ple from that distribution. This assumption resonates with much
existing literature. First, Kamenica (2008) presents a model in
which choosers infer that choice options reflect the preferences
of the population, and thereby explains choice overload effects.
In consumer psychology it also been suggested that people treat
choice options as informative about the marketplace, as when
a medium-height person will rationally choose a sweatshirt size
near the middle of the available range of size options (Prelec,
Wernerfelt, and Zettelmeyer, 1997; Simonson, 2008; Wernerfelt,
1995). A further claim, found in cognitive psychology, is that people
update their estimates about quantities such as market prices on
the basis of experimentally-provided options, particularly when
initial uncertainty is high (Brown, Sanborn, Aldrovandi, andWood,
2015; Shenoy and Yu, 2013; Sher andMcKenzie, 2014). Our claim
is of this latter type: we assume that people update prior beliefs
about market distributions on the basis of sets of choice options.
The third assumption is that the probability of choosing an
alternative is determined via dominance relations between items
in the mental sample. This assumption is consistent with and
motivated by a large body of research in psychology that sug-
gests that subjective valuation involves a series of simple ordinal
comparisons between pairs of items (e.g. Stewart, Chater, and
Brown, 2006; see also Kornienko, 2013). For example, the Decision
by Sampling model (DbS: Stewart et al., 2006) assumes that
subjective values are determined by (a) retrieving a small sample
of comparison items drawn from memory and the environment,
(b) tallying via binary ordinal comparisons the number of com-
parison attribute values that are smaller than the target attribute
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value, (c) tallying the number of comparison attribute values that
are larger than the target attribute value, and (d) computing the
relative ranked position of the target attribute value within the
comparison context provided by the comparison sample. Stewart
et al. use these assumptions to explain the form of, inter alia,
the value and probability weighting functions in Prospect Theory.
The key psychological assumption that MADS inherits from DbS
is the idea that purely ordinal comparisons are involved in the
construction of subjective values. A considerable amount of evi-
dence within both economic and psychological domains finds that
subjective valuations are affected by the relative ranked position
of attribute values within a comparison context. Such findings are
consistent with the suggestion that (in process terms) valuations
are constructed through a series of ordinal comparisons andwe are
not aware of cardinalmodels that can capture the relevant data. An
initial strand of research that examined people’s judgments of the
subjectivemagnitudes of simple psychophysical quantities such as
size and weight found such judgments to be determined partly by
the relative ranked position they occupy within a comparison con-
text (e.g., Parducci, Calfee, Marshall, & Davidson, 1960; Parducci &
Perrett, 1971; Riskey, Parducci, & Beauchamp, 1979). Subsequent
work found that quantities as diverse as prices (Niedrich, Sharma,
& Wedell, 2001; Niedrich, Weathers, Hill, & Bell, 2009), personal-
ity (Wood, Brown, Maltby, & Watkinson, 2012), fairness (Mellers,
1982), body perception (Wedell, Santoyo, & Pettibone, 2005) and
alcohol consumption (Wood, Brown, & Maltby, 2012), as well as
many others, are judged at least partly in terms of their relative
ranked position within a comparison context. Students’ attitudes
to anticipated graduation debt is determined partly by the ranked
position of their anticipated debt relative to the assumed debt of
others (Aldrovandi, Wood, Maltby, & Brown, 2015). Rank of in-
come, rather than income per se, determines satisfaction with that
income (Boyce, Brown, & Moore, 2010; Smith, Diener, & Wedell,
1989), and people’s anticipated and experienced satisfaction with
awage are both related to how thewage rankswithin a comparison
context (Brown, Gardner, Oswald, & Qian, 2008). Moreover, some
neuro-imaging evidence is consistent with rank-based coding of
value in the brain (Mullett & Tunney, 2013). There is therefore a
considerable body of evidence consistent with the idea that cardi-
nal valuations result from a process of binary ordinal comparisons,
and the dominance relations that the present account assumes are
of this binary ordinal type.
To link our model with the classical utility paradigm, we note
here that features of the classical utility approach are obtained
as a limiting case of MADS: If individuals’ sampling distributions
do not depend on the choice sets they face and the number of
items sampled approaches infinity then choices are deterministic,
consistent across contexts and context effects are not predicted.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2
we present an intuitive description of how MADS explains the
three context effects, followed by a formal model description and
specification of sufficient conditions on the sampling distribution
for MADS to predict the effects. In Sections 3 and 4 we report the
experimental design and results. Section 5 provides a discussion
of the model, relates it to other approaches within economics and
psychology, and concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Informal illustration
We now provide an intuitive introduction to the model and
illustrate how it accounts for the attraction, compromise and sim-
ilarity effects. Faced with a choice set, an individual draws a finite
sample of n items tomind. The distribution fromwhich the n items
are drawn is assumed to be influenced by the set of choice options.
Fig. 2. Multi-attribute decision by sampling. A two-alternative example of how
MADS operates. For ease of exposition, assume that the shaded area represents the
support of a uniform sampling distribution. As lower prices and higher quality are
preferred, a point is dominated if it lies to the south-east of another.
Each choice alternative is then compared to the other choice alter-
natives and to the items in the sample, accruing a point for every
one that it dominates. The alternativewith the highest score is then
selected.2 Consider the choice set {A, B} in Fig. 2. The shaded area
represents the distribution over the whole marketplace of options
from which the individual draws a sample of size n. Each of the
n comparison items increases the probability of choosing A, the
probability of choosing B, or neither. The effect of a comparatorwill
depend on where in the price× quality space it falls. Consider the
regions marked RA, RB, and RAB. RB is the dominance region exclu-
sive to option B, which we refer to as B’s solo-dominance region.
Any item that falls within RB is more expensive than both A and B,
lower quality than B, and higher quality than A. Thus B dominates
any item in RB. Items in RB are more expensive but also higher
quality than option A, so they are not dominated by A. Similarly,
comparison items that fall in RA are dominated exclusively by A.
Finally, items that fall in RAB are dominated by both A and B so
RAB is referred to as a joint-dominance region. MADS assumes that
choice is determined by how many comparison items fall into
each of these regions. The distribution from which comparison
items are drawn will therefore affect whether A or B is chosen.
In Fig. 2, a larger portion of the shaded area falls into RA than RB,
meaning that A is more likely to be chosen. Note that because of
the probabilistic nature of the sampling process, Awill not always
be chosen, especially if the comparison sample is small, leading to
a stochastic element of choice in our model.3
MADS assumes that an alternative accrues a pointwhen an item
falls in its solo-dominance region. For items in a joint-dominance
region, a point accrues to any of the dominating alternatives’
scores with equal probability. Therefore, if there are no dominance
relations between the alternatives in the choice set, the alternative
with the highest probability of accumulating a point is also the
most likely to be chosen. The model provides analytic expressions
for the probabilities of choosing each alternative from a choice set;
these expressions are provided in Appendix.
We now provide an intuition for how MADS accounts for each
of the three context effects using example sampling distributions,
shown in Figs. 3–5. These distributions are chosen for illustrative
purposes only. More specifically, they show examples of sufficient
conditions rather than necessary configurations of the sampling
2 Note that because there is a finite number of comparison items,whetherwe use
counts or proportions for value is irrelevant for selecting the highest-value item.
3 As n→∞, choice becomes deterministic.
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Fig. 3. Attraction effect.
Fig. 4. Compromise effect.
distributions required for MADS to produce the effects. For gen-
eral, formal statements of the conditions required of the sampling
distributions to produce each context effect, see Propositions 1–3
in Section 2.2.
An illustration of how the sampling distribution is hypothesized
to depend on the attraction effect choice sets is given by Fig. 3.
Here, the triangular nature of the attraction effect choice set pulls
more of the density of the sampling distribution to the dominance
region of the target (A in the left panel, B in the right). This increases
the probability that comparison items are drawn from the target’s
dominance region. Thiswill tend to increase the score accumulated
by the target relative to the non-target alternative, and hence will
increase the probability of it being chosen. Furthermore, attraction
effect choice sets include a dominated alternative which gives the
target a head-start in the accumulation of points.
The intuition behind the explanation of the compromise effect
is illustrated by Fig. 4. When the shift in the choice set is accom-
panied by a corresponding shift of the sampling distribution as
shown, the central alternative has the solo-dominance regionwith
the most density. In addition, the target (compromise) alternative
enjoys a joint-dominance region with each of the other alterna-
tives. These two facts combined imply that in both panels, the
central alternative has the highest chance of accruing a point, and
hence the highest chance of being chosen: the compromise effect.
The intuition behind our account of the similarity effect is
illustrated by Fig. 5. The effect is driven by the fact that the non-
target alternative (B in the left panel, A in the right) is forced to
share its solo-dominance regionwith the decoy. On the other hand,
the target alternative is left with a relatively large solo-dominance
region, increasing the probability of it being chosen: the similarity
effect occurs.
2.2. Formal description
Each x ∈ X is referred to as a choice alternative, and X the
choice set. Each choice alternative is J−dimensional, where x =
(x1, . . . , xJ ) describes the level of each attribute of alternative x.
Given X , the individual samples from a J−dimensional distribution
or sampling distribution over the product space, with CDF denoted
FX . There are n > 0 draws made from FX . For the purposes of
this paper we assume draws are independently and identically
distributed and that FX contains no mass points. MADS describes
two stages of cognitive processing. In the first stage, a sample is
generated. The set of draws sampled is denotedW where a typical
element is w = (w1, . . . , wJ ) ∈ W .
In the second stage, a score for each choice alternative is de-
termined and a choice is made. The score of an alternative x is
constructed via ordinal binary comparisons of its attribute levels
against those of other items in the reference set X ∪W , with typical
element r = (r1, . . . , rJ ). Elements of this set are referred to as
comparators or comparison items. Choice alternatives accrue points
when they are compared to comparison items that they dominate.
Where more than one choice alternative dominates a comparison
item, one of the choice alternatives is selected at random to accrue
a point.Where there are dominance relationswithin the choice set,
wemake the simplifying assumption that the dominated choice al-
ternative does not accrue any points, as described formally below.
The choice alternative with the highest total score is then chosen.
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Fig. 5. Similarity effect.
To represent the process explicitly, let ≿j be the rational binary
preference relation which an individual has over levels of the
attributes j = 1, . . . , J over any two items. Therefore x dominates y
if x≿j y for j = 1, . . . , J .4 In the case of hotels, where the attributes
are price (p) and rating (q), both preference relations are assumed
to be monotonic: x ≿p y ⇐⇒ xp ≤ yp and x ≿q y ⇐⇒ xq ≥ yq.
The choice correspondence c : X ↦→ X can then be expressed as:
c(X) = argmax
x∈X
{s(x)}
where,
s(x) = |{r ∈ {W ∪ X} : A(r) = x}|
A(r) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
one member of DX˜ (r), each selected with probability
1⏐⏐DX˜ (r)⏐⏐ if DX˜ (r) ̸= ∅∅ else
DX˜ (r) =
{
x ∈ X˜ \ r : x ≿j r, j = 1, . . . , J
}
X˜ = {x ∈ X : there is no y ∈ X such that y ≿j x and
y ̸= x, j = 1, . . . , J}
If c(X) is a singleton, then this item is chosen. If it contains more
than one element, then each element of the set is chosen with
equal probability. In this notation, X˜ is the set of undominated
alternatives in the choice set. DX˜ (r) is the set of choice alternatives
in X˜ that dominate r (excluding comparison with itself), A(r) is the
alternative that accumulates a point from comparison item r , and
s(x) is the total score accumulated for each choice alternative.
We now provide sufficient conditions on the sampling distribu-
tions required forMADS to predict each of the three context effects.
We provide sufficient conditions under an assumption of symme-
try between the sampling distributions across the two choice sets
of each context effect, which provides a clean statement for how
the model can generate the effects. The symmetry conditions state
that the probability of sampling an itemwhich affects the expected
scores of A and B by the same amount, across the different choice
sets, is the same. If these conditions are satisfied, we can focus
solely on the probabilities of items falling in regions that affect the
difference in the scores.
More general conditions, which allow for a relaxation of sym-
metry, are still expressible analytically, but no longer have the
simplicity of those in Propositions 1–3 as they require conditions
quantifying the asymmetry and on n. Where data do not satisfy
4 Notice that the probability of sampling a point identical to another is zero
because distributions are assumed to have no mass points.
symmetry, the full expressions for choice probabilities can be used
directly to check when the context effects are expected. These
expressions are provided in Appendix.
With symmetry assumed, we now reveal the simple conditions
driving our intuition that are required for the sampling distri-
butions to produce the effects. Figs. 3–5 are the counterparts of
the Propositions below which display distributions that satisfy
the conditions, where for ease of reference, one can suppose that
shaded areas represents a uniform density, integrating to one.
Proofs are relegated to Appendix.
Denote the probability of a sampled comparison item being
dominated by an alternative x, given choice set X , as FX (x). Further-
more, let F{A,B,DA} and F{A,B,DB} be denoted by A and B respectively,
where DA and DB are the decoys making A and B the targets
respectively andwhere the exact positioning of the decoy depends
on which context effect is in question. This means for example,
that A(B) is the probability of a sampled item falling in the solo-
dominance region of B from the sampling distribution induced
by {A, B,DA}. For joint dominance regions, we analogously denote
A(A, B) (B(A, B)) as the probability of drawing an item which is
dominated by both A and B from the sampling distribution induced
by {A, B,DA} ({A, B,DB}).
Proposition 1 (Attraction). Themodel produces the attraction effect
if:
(i) Symmetry: A(A, B) = B(A, B), A(A) = B(B) and A(B) = B(A).
(ii) A(A)A(B)
[
= B(B)B(A)
]
> 1.
Condition (ii) states that the probability of an item falling in the
solo-dominance region of the target is greater than the probability
of an item falling in the solo-dominance region of the non-target.
This implies it is more likely that the target accumulates a point.
Because the item with the highest score is chosen, the attraction
effect results.
Proposition 2 (Compromise). The model produces the compromise
effect if the following are satisfied:
(i) Symmetry: A(A) = B(B), A(B) = A(CA) = B(A) = B(CB),
A(A, B) = A(A, CA) = B(A, B) = B(B, CB) and A(A, B, CA) =
B(A, B, CB).
(ii) A(A)+
1
2A(A,B)+ 12A(A,CA)
B(A)+ 12B(A,B)
[
= B(B)+ 12B(A,B)+ 12B(B,CB)A(B)+ 12A(A,B)
]
> 1.
The condition B(B) + 12B(A, B) + 12B(B, CB) > A(B) + 12A(A, B)
says that the probability of a point being accumulated to B’s score is
higher under {A, B, CB} than {A, B, CA} i.e., p(B|ABCB) > p(B|ABCA),
the compromise effect. Note that if B’s solo-dominance region is
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larger when it is the target it helps to produce the effect. Notice
also, that when B is the target, it has two joint-dominance regions,
but it has only one when it is not the target. This accounts for the
presence of an extra joint-dominance region in the numerator of
(ii). A similar argument can be made for A.
Proposition 3 (Similarity). The model produces the similarity effect
if the following are satisfied:
(i) Symmetry: A(A) = B(B), A(B) = B(A), A(SA) = B(SB),
A(A, SA) = B(B, SB), A(B, SA) = B(A, SB) and A(A, B, SA) =
B(A, B, SB).
(ii) A(A)+
1
2A(A,SA)
B(A)+ 12B(A,SB)
[
= B(B)+ 12B(B,SB)A(B)+ 12A(B,SA)
]
> 1.
The condition B(B) + 12B(B, SB) > A(B) + 12A(B, SA) says that
the probability of B accruing a point is higher when {A, B, SB} is the
choice set, than when {A, B, SA} is. Hence p(B|ABSB) > p(B|ABSA),
the similarity effect. By inspection of Fig. 5 one can see that B(B)
is likely to be greater than A(B) due to the configuration of the
similarity effect choice sets. Although A(B, SA) is also likely to be
greater than B(B, SB), these joint-dominance regions only add to
B’s score with probability 12 . A similar argument can be made for A.
The symmetry conditions of Propositions 1–3 suppose that indi-
viduals’ sampling distributionswill depend on the relative position
of the choice set’s alternatives to each other, but will otherwise
be the same. Assuming symmetry allows for a clear exposition,
permitting explanations to rely on a ratio consisting of a few areas
of the sampling distribution’s density. We consider symmetry a
natural benchmark case, especially for markets where individuals
have had no prior experience. In practice, when individuals are
evaluating items, they will draw not only on the choice set pre-
sented to them, but also on their prior experience or knowledge
of the product. This can also be expected to affect their sampling
distribution. For hotels, for example, if individuals have predom-
inantly had exposure to cheaper, lower quality hotels than those
in the choice sets offered, their sampling distributions are likely
to place more weight on this end of the market. This would cause
the distributions to be asymmetric. MADS provides analytically
expressible choice probabilities for any sampling distribution i.e.,
regardless of symmetry. However, the symmetric case provides
tractable statements that carry the intuition for the explanation of
the context effects.
3. Experiment 1
3.1. Design
Choice alternatives for both experimentswereManhattan hotel
stays, for which there are twomain attributes: ‘average rating’ and
‘price’. Data pertaining to real hotels were taken from Hotels.com
on 23 June 2014. We recorded the price and average rating of the
cheapest 200 hotel stays for a one-night stay for one adult in one
room, for a stay on 12 November 2014. Fig. 6 provides a plot of the
hotel data recorded. ‘Average rating’ refers to the rating given by
members of Hotels.com who had previously stayed at the hotel.5
We presented the score rounded to one decimal place, as it is
presented on thewebsite itself. This served as our proxy for quality,
so that we could present data across the price-quality domain,
as in classical context-effect experiments. Given the familiarity of
such sites to internet users, we referred to ‘average rating’ rather
than ‘quality’ throughout the experiment. 12 distinct hotels were
selected from these data to form the six choice sets of the three
context effects, shown in Table 1. Aswithmost studies showing the
presence of these context effects, participants’ hotel choices were
hypothetical.
5 Each reviewer submits a score of 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, where higher numbers corre-
spond to a better experience. All the hotels we recorded had at least 25 reviews.
Fig. 6. Hotel data.
Table 1
Choice sets (price in USD, rating).
Alternative Attraction Compromise Similarity
A 125 3.6 179 3.5 194 3.5
B 249 4.4 233 4.0 239 4.2
DA 159 3.3 130 2.9 231 4.1
DB 278 4.1 287 4.5 199 3.6
The choice sets used in the experiments. To match the terminology used in the text
and Fig. 1, relabel the decoys DA (DB) as TA (TB), CA (CB) or SA (SB) respectively for the
attraction, compromise and similarity effect choice sets.
1304 Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers were recruited
in July 2014. It was decided in advance that 1200 participants
would be tested; 1300 were requested from AMT in order to be
able to remove some if there were those who had completed
a related pilot, and 1304 were received. There is considerable
variation in the size of context effects in the literature, and they
are of course not always found (Trueblood, Brown, & Heathcote,
2015). Estimates from studies in consumer choice find sizes rang-
ing from about 0.15 (see Table 1 of Trueblood et al., 2013) to over
0.3 (Noguchi & Stewart, 2014). We chose to ensure 100 partici-
pants per condition; this gives a power of 0.8 to detect a difference
in choice proportion of 0.2 when comparing two conditions with
each other.
We excluded 68 participants from the analysis because they
had previously completed a related pilot study; one was removed
because they did not complete the experiment. This left data from
1235 participants for analysis. Average completion time was 14
minutes 27 seconds. Participants were compensated with a par-
ticipation fee of $1.50, which corresponds to an average hourly
wage of $6.23. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 12
conditions = 3 [attraction, compromise, similarity] × 2 [A target,
B target]= 6 choice sets× 2 conditions [treatment, control].
Participants in the treatment condition each saw data relating
to ten hotels taken from the dataset before selecting an alternative
from one of the six choice sets. They were shown the price and
average rating of each of these ten hotels one at a time, and for
each one were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale how likely
they would be to stay at that hotel. The purpose of asking this was
to ensure some amount of engagement with the hotels presented,
such that they would affect the hotels available in the participants’
comparison sample. An example screen-shot is provided in Fig. 7.
Following the treatment, participants faced one of the choice sets
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Fig. 7. Screen-shot of the manipulation. Note that the slider was not visible until the participant clicked on the scale.
Fig. 8. Manipulating choice: method. Treated participants saw ten hotels (crosses) in a random order prior to facing a ternary choice set: A and B plus one of the decoys
(unfilled circles), as detailed in Table 1. Notice that in the attraction and compromise choice sets, only alternative B is promoted. In the similarity set including a decoy close
to B i.e., {A, B, SA}, both B and the decoy are promoted because they are so close together.
and answered the question ‘‘Which hotel would you bemost likely
to choose?’’. Participants in the control condition simply chose
without seeing any other hotels first. Participants were later asked
to indicate how they divided their attention when considering
hotel choices using a seven-point scalewhere 1meant ‘‘considered
solely prices’’, 4 meant ‘‘both attributes equally’’, and 7 ‘‘solely
ratings’’. Before finishing, participants faced a series of questions
for another experiment. Basic demographic questions followed on
the final screen.
The ten hotels shown in the treatment condition were chosen
from our data shown in Fig. 6 such that they were dominated by
alternative B (the more expensive, higher-quality alternative), but
not dominated by alternative A (the cheaper, lower-quality alter-
native), in the choice set they faced afterwards. Because the hotels
in each context effect choice set were different, a different set of
hotels was used as amanipulation for each choice set.Where there
were more than ten candidate hotels fitting this description, ten
were chosen at random. Every participant in the same choice set
saw the same ten hotels, but in a random order. The manipulation
is illustrated by Fig. 8. Notice that in the attraction and compromise
choice sets, only alternative B is promoted. In the similarity set
including a decoy close to B i.e., {A, B, SA}, both B and the decoy
are promoted, because they are close together. We now refer to
the promoted alternatives asmanipulation targets.
3.2. Choice and context effect manipulation
The treatment effect is the difference in theproportion of partic-
ipants choosing themanipulation targets in the treatment and con-
trol conditions. Overall, the proportion of times participants chose
the manipulation targets was 22% higher following the treatment
(.32 in the control vs. .39 in the treatment; p = .012).
Our theory supposes that this manipulation will be successful
because the hotels that participants were shown are dominated
by the manipulation targets on both attributes, but by the other
alternatives in the choice set on only one attribute. Therefore,
we expect the manipulation to have the most impact when in-
dividuals pay attention to both attributes. Table 2 shows large
differences in themanipulation effect depending onwhether or not
participants paid attention to both attributes equally. Themajority
of participants paid attention to both attributes equally and of
these, the treated participants chose the manipulation targets .17
more (p < .001), corresponding to a relative increase of 47% in
the proportion choosing the targets. There was no effect of the
manipulation on the choices of participants who paid attention
unequally.
MADS is intentionally as simple as possible, and implicitly as-
sumes that participants pay equal attention to both dimensions.6
We therefore continue the analysis using data from participants
who reported paying equal attention to both dimensions.7 Using
the data of these participants, Table 3 shows the effect of the
manipulation broken down by which context effect choice set
6 While extensions to the model to account for differential weighting of dimen-
sions are possible, these involve adding additional parameters and compromise the
analytic tractability and conciseness of the present approach.
7 Subsidiary analysis of the choices made by participants who reported paying
unequal attention to the two dimensions were as expected: the 73% (56%) who
paidmore attention to price (rating) chose the cheapest (highest-rated) of the three
options.
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Table 2
Manipulating choice.
Attribute attention Observations Control Treatment Manipulation effect P-value
All (1-7) 1235 .32 .39 .07* .012
Equal (4) 632 .36 .53 .17* .000
Non-equal (1-3, 5-7) 603 .28 .29 .01 .810
Attribute attention: sliding scale of integers {1, . . . , 7}where 1= only considered price, 4= considered both attributes
equally, 7= only considered quality. Control and Treatment report the proportions of participants choosingmanipulation
targets in the control and treatment groups respectively. The only difference between the control and the treatment
is that those treated first observed and rated ten additional hotels, as described in Section 3.1. Which alternative(s)
were manipulation targets depends on which of the choice sets (listed in Table 1) an individual was allocated to. In the
attraction and compromise choice sets along with the similarity effect choice set {A, B, SB}, Bwas the sole manipulation
target. In the similarity effect choice set {A, B, SA}, both B and the decoy SA were manipulation targets. Manipulation
effect: the difference in the proportion of participants choosing the manipulation targets in the treatment and control
conditions. P-values are from two-proportion z-tests against the null of no effect.
* (indicates p < .05).
Table 3
Manipulating choice, by choice sets.
Context effect Observations Control Treatment Manipulation effect P-value
Attraction 206 .29 .60 .31* .000
Compromise 217 .35 .40 .05 .431
Similarity 209 .43 .59 .16* .019
This table breaks down the effect of the manipulation presented in Table 2 by the choice sets that participants were
assigned to (there are two choice sets per context effect). Data is from participants who paid equal attention to both
attributes. P-values are from two-proportion z-tests against the null of no effect.
* (indicates p < .05).
Fig. 9. Manipulating context effects: method. Price is on the x-axis, average rating on the y-axis. The treatment was to expose participants to ten hotels (the crosses) prior to
them facing one of the choice sets (the solid circles). The treatment was intended to increase the choice share of alternative Bwithin the ensuing choice set which dominated
all these ten hotels. The treated (untreated) participants’ experience is represented by the top (bottom) row of diagrams.We predict that the context effects will be countered
or enhanced due to this treatment. As an example, consider countering the attraction effect by comparing the choice shares of B of the participants whose experience is
represented by (i) the top-leftmost panel, to (ii) the bottom-leftmost panel. Similar comparisons within each of the six columns of the figure allow an assessment of whether
the context effects were countered or enhanced.
the participant was assigned to. Within all three context effects’
choice sets, the manipulation effect was in the predicted direction
(i.e., positive), although only significantly so for the attraction and
similarity effects.
Our design permits us to attempt to counter and enhance
the three context effects. For example, the attraction effect says
that alternative B will be chosen more often from {A, B, TB} than
{A, B, TA}, with nomanipulation. When participants choosing from
{A, B, TA} are instead in the treatment condition, we predict that
B will be more popular than if they were not. Therefore, when
we compare choices from participants who faced {A, B, TB} in the
control and {A, B, TA} in the treatment group, we predict that the
attraction effect will be reduced. This example corresponds to the
first column in Fig. 9. The remaining columns describe which data
from which conditions are compared to investigate the impact on
the context effects.
We know from Table 2 that the manipulations had a significant
impact on choices. Fig. 10 shows how choicemanipulations in turn
affected the presence and strength of the attraction, compromise
and similarity effects.
The attraction effectwas replicatedwith an effect of p(B|A, B, TB)
− p(B|A, B, TA) = .34, significantly different from zero.8 When we
enhanced the context effect through our manipulation, the effect
size almost doubled, to .65. When we countered the effect, the
effect fell to .07 which is insignificantly different from zero. The
8 An effect of .34 means that 34% more people chose B from {A, B, TB} than from
{A, B, TA}.
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Fig. 10. Manipulating context effects: evidence. The size of context effect is the difference in the choice proportions of alternative B. (C) denotes countering and (E) enhancing
where the choice data used for each are depicted in the columns of Fig. 9; (N) denotes ‘neutral’, which refers to our attempt to replicate the context effects. Standard error
bars are given. Solid circles refer to a significant context effect i.e., different from zero, at the 5% level from a two-proportion z-test against the null of no effect. Hollow circles
refer to no significant difference from zero, and hence no context effect.
compromise effect was replicated with an effect of p(B|A, B, CB) −
p(B|A, B, CA) = .38, significantly different from zero. Countering
the compromise effect reduced it to .31 and enhancing lifted it
to .43. The similarity effect i.e., p(B|A, B, SB) − p(B|A, B, SA) > 0,
was not replicated, with an effect insignificantly different from
zero. Our theory dictates that the presence of context effects is
probabilistic and we are not the first study to find that the simi-
larity effect is the weakest (e.g., Noguchi & Stewart, 2014).9 More
importantly, our manipulations did have an effect. Countering the
similarity effect pushed the size down to -.15, which is marginally
significantly different from zero (p = .079). When we enhanced
the effect, the size became .20, which is significantly different from
zero.
4. Experiment 2
4.1. Design
The data generated by 607 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers
were used. The participants of experiment 2 were also the con-
trol group for experiment 1. Following their choice, and hence
exposure to a choice set, we elicited what participants inferred
about the rest of the hotel market. It would have been infeasible
to ask them for their best guess of all the other 197 hotels in our
dataset. Instead we asked them to estimate the price and quality
of a randomly chosen 20. They were told that 20 hotels had been
randomly selected from our dataset, which they had to estimate.
These 20 did not include the three they had already seen in their
choice set. Participantswere able to see their choice set throughout
the elicitation process, but not to change their choice.
To elicit their estimation of the market distribution, they com-
pleted two screens. On the second screen, we asked participants
to plot where they thought these 20 hotels lay in price × rating
space, based on the choice set they had seen. That is, they were
shown their choice set plotted on a pair of axes and required to
plot where they thought the 20 additional hotels were located. An
example screen-capture is provided in Fig. 11. The example par-
ticipant shown chose from a similarity effect choice set, {A, B, SA},
which typically promotes the cheapest option A (labeled in the
figure for the benefit of the reader). The participant has placed
9 Note thatwhenwe looked at individuals’ sampling distributionswe did not sig-
nificantly predict choice in the similarity effect conditions, but did in the attraction
and compromise effect conditions (see Table 4).
nine plots so far. The choice set was displayed in red; plots in
green. To avoid possible anchoring effects, we did not include grid
lines, axis ticks or axis-tick labels. To scale the axes, we asked for
their best guess of the minimum and maximum price and average
rating of the 23 hotels (including the choice set they faced). The
minimum and maximum value of each axis was determined by
participants themselves on the first screen, which they could not
return to. Illogical answers, e.g., that theminimumwas higher than
the maximum, were not allowed. The on-screen size of the plotter
was fixed to be a square; participants only determined the scale
of the axes. Participants were shown the coordinates where their
mouse was hovering, were able to remove the points they had
plotted and start again by ‘resetting’ the graph and were provided
with a counter telling them how many points they still had to
place.
We did not allow participants to go back to change the min-
imum and maximum values for the axes due to concerns that
participants would tweak their answers to move their choice set
around the plotter. We removed data of participants who entered
values extreme enough such that the choice set would be shown
bunched into the corner of the screen.10 We chose the cut-off to be
a price of $800; anyone entering this value or higher was excluded.
This removed 35 participants, leaving 572 for analysis.
As an incentive payment, participants were told that the five
who plotted closest to the 20 hotels would be paid $5 as a bonus.
The procedure we used to determine who was the closest was
the modified-Hausdorff metric, as advocated by Dubuisson and
Jain (1994). This metric provides a distance based on the average
minimum pairwise distances between two sets of coordinates. In
our case, these two setswere the participant’s plotted data, and the
20hotels randomly chosen. Participantswere not told the details of
the metric; they were simply told that the five participants whose
plots were ‘closest’ to the 20 we had would be paid.
4.2. Aggregate distribution elicitation
Each panel of Fig. 12 presents the pooled plots placed by all
≈100 participants per choice set, meaning there are roughly 2000
plots in each panel. We provide the proportions of plots contained
within the crucial areas identified by theory. We draw on patterns
in these aggregate data which illustrate how choice sets affect
10 Confirming this concern, we were in fact contacted by one participant who had
entered a maximum price of $5000, who wanted to explain their choice to us.
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Fig. 11. Screen-capture of distribution elicitation.
distributions and that these distributionsmove inways compatible
with our theory to produce the context effects.We discuss features
of this aggregate distribution data as if it were in fact the distri-
bution of all individuals in order to demonstrate how we consider
context effects can arise. The individual-level data are explored in
the next subsection.
Recall that MADS supposes that movements in the sampling
distributions change the probabilities of alternatives being in-
cluded in the comparison set, and hence affect choice probabilities.
First, we test whether in fact there has been any difference in
the distributions elicited across the choice sets for each context
effect. Casual inspection of the heat-maps suggests pronounced
movement of the density of the plotted points between choice sets.
Using a multi-dimensional version of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test, as proposed by Fasano and Franceschini (1987), we found that
within each of the three context effects the distributions elicited
from participants differed significantly (p < .001) depending on
which choice set they had seen. We now turn to see whether the
movements of these aggregate data coincide with MADS’s account
of the context effects.
The attraction effect panels show the density of the two solo-
dominance regions in each condition that determine the choice
probabilities. Comparing left ({A, B, TA}) to right ({A, B, TB}): .05 of
the density shifts fromA’s dominance regionwhenA is the target to
B’s dominance regionwhen B is the target. According toMADS, this
shift in density means that A has a higher chance of accumulating
a point on the left, and B a higher chance on the right. In turn, this
implies A has a higher probability of being chosen from {A, B, TA}
than {A, B, TB}, and similarly B from {A, B, TB} than {A, B, TA}: the
attraction effect. The fact that the target enjoys a 1-0 head-start in
the score accumulation from the decoy only serves to strengthen
the effect.
In the compromise effect panels, the total density in the solo and
two-way-joint dominance regions is shown. These are the regions
that determine the ranking of the probabilities of the three choice
alternatives accumulating a point. In the left panel ({A, B, CA})
these regions give A an approximate .09 + 12 (.02 + .03) = .115
probability of accumulating a point, .06+ 12 (.03) = .075 for B and
.06 + 12 (.02) = .07 for CA. Similarly in the right panel ({A, B, CB}),
the regions give the probability of A, B and CB accruing a point
respectively as approximately .08, .095, .085. As A is the most
likely to accrue a point when it is the target, but the least likely
when B is, its probability of being chosen is> 13 and<
1
3 in the two
conditions respectively. Similarly, as B is the most likely to accrue
a point when it is the target, but approximately joint-least likely
when A is, its probability of being chosen is> 13 and<
1
3 in the two
conditions respectively. As A is chosenmore often in {A, B, CA} than
in {A, B, CB} and Bmore often in {A, B, CB} than in {A, B, CA}, MADS
predicts the compromise effect would arise with these aggregate
data.
In the similarity effect panels, the two regions that affect the
relative scores of the choice alternatives that have a non-negligibly
small amount of density are shown. In the left panel ({A, B, SA})
these regions give the probability of A, B and SA accruing a point
respectively as approximately .09, .05, .05. Similarly in the right
panel ({A, B, SB}), the regions give the probability of A, B and SB
accruing a point respectively as approximately .045, .12, .045. As
A is the most likely to accrue a point when it is the target, but
the joint-least likely when B is, its probability of being chosen is
> 13 and <
1
3 in the two conditions respectively. Similarly, as B is
the most likely to accrue a point when it is the target, but joint-
least likely when A is, its probability of being chosen is > 13 and
< 13 in the two conditions respectively. As A is chosen more often
in {A, B, SA} than in {A, B, SB} and B more often in {A, B, SB} than
in {A, B, SA}, MADS predicts the similarity effect would arise with
these aggregate data.
4.3. Individual-level estimation results
Finally,we examinedwhether itwas possible to predict individ-
uals’ choices. Ourmodel imposes no assumptions or parameters on
an individual’s sampling distribution, but with only 20 plots per
participant, empirical distributions at the individual level are too
coarse to reasonably enable prediction. Therefore, we selected the
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Fig. 12. Plotting data by choice set and aggregate-PDF values. Aggregate estimated sampling distributions. A lighter tone refers to a higher density of plots. The numbers
refer to the proportion of points plotted in that region i.e., the empirical density. Graphics are cropped at 2/5 for quality, and $500 for price; over 95% of the plotting data is
in this range.
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Table 4
Predicting individuals’ choices.
Context effect Observations Null Predicted p-value
Attraction 194 .50 .62 .001
Compromise 180 .33 .42 .014
Similarity 198 .33 .30 .327
The null hypotheses are those implied by random prediction between all non-
dominated choice alternatives. p-values are from two-sided binomial tests.
multivariate distribution that best-fitted each participant’s plots.
Various copulas (Gaussian, t, Frank, Gumbel and Clayton) were
fitted to each participant’s estimate of the distribution of 23 points
(20 plotted and 3 from their choice set).11 Copula selection for each
participant was determined by the Akaike Information Criterion.
For each participant we then identified the choice that was most
likely on the basis of that participant’s estimated sampling distri-
bution. The proportion of correct predictions is reported in Table 4.
It can be seen that the choices were reasonably well predicted for
participants in the attraction and compromise conditions but not
in the similarity conditions. These findings are congruent with the
fact that we replicated the attraction and compromise effects but
not the similarity effect, as shown in Fig. 10.
To compute the estimates of Table 4, it was necessary to
estimate the MADS parameter n, which specifies the number of
comparison items brought to mind from individuals’ sampling
distributions. We calculated the probability of participants’ choice
data for different values of n and found the maximum likelihood
estimate to be 4.12 The estimate is precise in the sense that it is
different fromboth 3 and 5 (LR tests p = .021 and p = .091 respec-
tively).We emphasize thatn = 4 is a psychologically realistic value
for working memory capacity (see Cowan, 2001), consistent with
the idea that comparison samples are held in working memory
during choice.
5. Discussion and conclusions
MADS offers a concise model of the attraction, compromise
and similarity effects. Two experiments tested the assumptions
of the model. In Experiment 1, prior exposure to a selection of
market options altered subsequent choices in ways predicted by
the model and allowed us to reduce and enhance two of the ‘big
three’ context effects documented in consumer choice. Experiment
2 demonstrated that individuals’ sampling distributions of mar-
ket options depend on the choice set in ways required for the
model to produce the effects. These results, consistent with recent
psychological studies of risky choice (e.g., Stewart, Reimers, and
Harris, 2015, Ungemach, Stewart, and Reimers, 2011) but here
pertaining to the classic context effects, suggest that assumptions
about background distributions, combined with choices made on
the basis of simple dominance relations, are sufficient to give rise
to context effects. Moreover, the maximum likelihood estimator
of the model’s central parameter for the number of comparators
sampled took on a psychologically realistic value for the capacity
of human working memory.
We note that we have remained theoretically neutral regarding
the psychological mechanisms that participants use when infer-
ring background distributions from a set of presented options.
Rather, we have simply used the data provided by participants and
selected the multivariate distribution that best fits those data. Our
account is compatiblewith a number ofways inwhich participants
11 Copulas are succinct descriptions of the correlation between two variables.
12 Three participants chose the decoy alternative from attraction effect choice sets
andwere excluded from the estimation. Ourmodel has no additional error term and
so predicts such behaviorwith probability zero. Inclusion of these participants’ data
would prevent the log-likelihood from being well defined.
might infer distributions (e.g., the Bayesian approaches described
by Natenzon, 2016 and Shenoy and Yu, 2013) but (a) we regard
the available data as insufficiently constraining to enable selection
of a particular mechanism, and (b) we believe that the present
account is best served by our avoidance of the additional degrees
of freedom that would be provided if we made an arbitrary choice.
Our data were generated by members of Amazon’s online
platform, Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT’s participant pop-
ulation has been shown to have the advantages of being more de-
mographically diverse, and producing data of a comparable quality
to more traditional participant methods (Paolacci and Chandler,
2014; Chandler, Mueller, and Paolacci, 2014). This has been shown
through many studies replicating classic experiments in various
domains including cognitive psychology (e.g., Paolacci, Chandler,
and Ipeirotis, 2010; Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema, 2013) and
economics (e.g., Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser, 2011). Some have
expressed concern that AMT participants may not pay sufficient
attention to the choice alternatives which may lead to a failure
to find the attraction effect (Simonson, 2014). However, we have
demonstrated that the classic context effects in consumer choice
can be found with such samples.
Our approach is rooted in and brings together various ap-
proaches within cognitive science, consumer psychology and eco-
nomics. In economics, some recent theoretical approaches have
been developed to show how anomalous choice behaviors can
be explained by cognitive limitations such as binary ordinal
comparison (e.g., Kornienko, 2013), memory limitations in fore-
casting (Mullainathan, 2002), psychological salience (Bordalo,
Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2012b, 2013) or as optimal responses to noise
(e.g., Howes, Warren, Farmer, El-Deredy, & Lewis, 2016; Robson,
2001; Steiner & Stewart, 2016). Our approach falls within this
tradition and also draws on information-sampling models of judg-
ment, most of which assume that judgments are typically made
on the basis of limited samples (e.g., Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler &
Juslin, 2006; Fiedler & Kareev, 2006; Lindskog, Winman, & Juslin,
2013). Relevant alternatives are assumed typically to be retrieved
from memory as well as, or instead of, being sampled from the
choice context.13 More specifically, our model can be seen as an
extension of rank-based models such as DbS (Stewart et al., 2006)
and samplingmodels that assume options are evaluated relative to
an assumed background distribution (see also Kornienko, 2013).
Related to suggestions in economics (Kamenica, 2008), market-
ing (Wernerfelt, 1995) and cognitive psychology (Shenoy & Yu,
2013; Sher &McKenzie, 2014), MADS assumes that people’s infer-
ences about the relevant background distributions are influenced
by the context of choice options.MADS, however, both extendsDbS
to themulti-dimensional case (see also Stewart & Simpson, 2008),
and specifies the role of choice options in causing the background
distribution to be updated.
More generally, MADS makes the same predictions as the clas-
sical utility paradigm as a limiting case: If we allow the number
of items sampled to approach infinity and assume individuals’
sampling distributions do not depend on the choice sets they
face, then choices become deterministic and context independent,
hence context effects are not predicted.
Our approach differs from those found in both economics and
psychology. Initial explanations within psychology focused on one
or two of the context effects at a time,making reference to decision
strategies such as elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972) or con-
cepts such as loss aversion (Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Tversky
& Simonson, 1993). Since then, process models have typically
had difficulty in accounting for all three effects within a unifying
13 For related approaches within the economic analysis of choice under uncer-
tainty, see Gennaioli & Shleifer (2010) and the case-based decision theory of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1995).
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framework without resorting to arguably ad hoc parameters or
separate mechanisms in order to capture all three effects simulta-
neously. In Simonson and Tversky (1992); Tversky and Simonson
(1993) two concepts are proposed. A tradeoff contrast operates via
either the local context (choice set) or the background context.
The introduction of a dominated alternative then enhances the
relative tradeoff of attributes of the dominating alternative, leading
to the attraction effect. Extremeness aversion specifies that the
absolute advantages and disadvantages of a choice option (rela-
tive to the other options) are weighed by a loss-averse decision
maker. A compromise (middle) alternative would then notch up
smaller losses through comparison to the other choice options,
whereas extreme alternatives suffer from larger losses, leading
to the compromise effect. In other models, attraction and com-
promise effects are attributed to loss aversion e.g., in the Leaking
Competing Accumulatorsmodel (Usher &McClelland, 2004) or at-
tention switching andmutual inhibition occurring between choice
options in Multi-alternative Decision Field Theory (Roe et al.,
2001). Bhatia (2013) proposes a model in which the accessibility
of attributes is determined by the attributes’ associations with
objects of potential choice. More accessible attributes in turn carry
higher weight in an evidence accumulation process. These models,
among others, can all account for the three key context effects.
However, in each case the three effects cannot be explained in
terms of a single mechanism. In Bhatia’s model for example, the
three effects can occur simultaneously but will not do so under all
parameter settings. In theMultiattribute Linear Ballistic Accumula-
tor model (Trueblood et al., 2014), the attraction and compromise
effects arise because objects that are closer to each other receive
larger attention weightings, whereas the similarity effect occurs
when confirmatory evidence is given more weight than discon-
firmatory evidence. Finally, in work regarding judgment rather
than consumer choice tasks, Bhatia (2014) investigates the role of
confirmatory search processes in explaining the attraction effect.
He finds increased retrieval of cues favoring the target optionwhen
a decoy is present, and that the attraction effect can be removed by
manipulating the availability of relevant cues. Our model is similar
in spirit in that the proportion of ‘cues’ (or ‘sampled items’ in our
case) that favor the target alternative is influenced by the choice
set. However, MADS differs in that it is built to model choice rather
than judgment, and in that it is more general e.g., applying also to
the compromise and similarity effects.
The models developed within economics also do not generally
offer an account of all three effects. However, in themodels that of-
fer explanations of the attraction (and some also the compromise)
effect, there is a recurring emphasis on dominance comparisons,
which resonates with our approach. In a model of limited atten-
tion, Masatlioglu et al. (2012) suggest that the attraction effect
reveals that the target alternative only enters the consideration set
when the dominated decoy is present (for a related analysis under
stochastic choice, see also Manzini and Mariotti, 2014). Ok et al.
(2015) showhowdominated choice alternatives can endogenously
act as reference points and constrain the consideration set to in-
clude only the dominating alternatives, leading to the attraction ef-
fect. de Clippel and Eliaz (2012) model the cooperative bargaining
problem of an individual with two selves, where each has a pref-
erence ordering over one attribute: Consider a choice alternative
receiving two scores obtained by counting its number of favorable
ordinal comparisons within each attribute and define the ‘minimal
score’ for the alternative as the lower of these two numbers. The
authors show that the solution to the bargaining problem is to
select the choice alternative with the highest minimal score. The
approach predicts the attraction and compromise effects, but not
the similarity effect. More broadly, in these frameworks choice is
deterministic. In MADS, stochastic choice follows directly from the
presence of the sampling process. Furthermore, it is unclear how
these other models could explain the effects of alternatives not
present in the choice set e.g., the ‘phantom decoy’ effect, which
can be thought of as working in the opposite direction to the
attraction effect. Taking a Bayesian approach, Natenzon (2016)
supposes that decision-makers receive information about their
preferences when they inspect the alternatives in the choice set,
forming posterior beliefs over various possible underlying stable
preference orderings. The author posits that dominance relations
make for a simple comparison and so emphasize dominant options,
leading to the attraction effect. Furthermore, Natenzon shows that
if the precision of signals about the decision-maker’s utility are
sufficiently low, the compromise effect is predicted. The model
we develop drops the classical economic assumption of a stable
underlying preference ordering, nesting it as an extreme case.
Instead,MADS relies on simple binary dominance relations, limited
sampling and systematic changes in sampling distribution in order
to allow the context to determine choice.14
As a result of its possession of these features, MADS contrasts
strongly with other models of context effects developed in eco-
nomics. For example, a number of economic models assign a
key role to the differential weighting of consumption dimensions
that may result from changes in the choice context. For exam-
ple, Bushong et al. (2015) assume that a dimension is weighted
less when the range of values on that dimension (from worst to
best) increases. The focusing model of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013)
assumes in contrast that greater weight is assigned to dimensions
on which choice options exhibit more variation. As Bushong et
al. note, range-based models have no natural way to incorporate
compromise effects without augmentation. Moreover, other more
general considerations may be thought to militate against range-
based dimensional weightingmodels. First, Wedell has argued in a
number of papers (e.g., Wedell, 1991; Wedell, 1998; Wedell and
Pettibone, 1996) against the idea that simple context effects of the
type discussed here reflect changes in the weighting of relevant
dimensions (although we note Bushong et al.’s observation that
weighting may become increasingly important as the number of
potentially relevant dimensions increases beyond the two that
we consider here). More generally, psychophysical research on
the subjective judgment of magnitudes has shown that the per-
ceived magnitude of an attribute value (and hence the perceived
difference between attribute values) is influenced not just by the
range of contextual stimuli, but also by the relative ranked posi-
tion that each attribute value occupies within a comparison con-
text. Moreover, there have been recent suggestions that apparent
range effects may really be ‘rank effects in disguise’ (Brown and
Matthews, 2011; Brown, Wood, Ogden, and Maltby, 2015). MADS,
with its assumption that binary ordinal comparisons form the basis
of choice, aligns closely to this tradition of research. Indeed, the
ordinal comparisons that MADS assumes are precisely the same
as those that are assumed to underpin judgment and choice in
psychological process models such as DbS (Stewart et al., 2006).
We therefore view MADS as aligning more closely with a range of
psychological evidence than do range-based models.
We have focused on possibly the three most widely discussed
context effects in the literature. Finally, we note here that MADS is
able to capture more. Firstly, another documented context effect
is the ‘phantom decoy’ effect (Pratkanis & Farquhar, 1992; Pet-
tibone & Wedell, 2000, 2007). There, the decoy option (which is
14 We also note that there is work in economics on sampling at the intersection
of industrial organization and bounded-rationality. Spiegler (2006b) examines the
consequences for a market when it is assumed that consumers sample one item
from past experience, and in Spiegler (2006a), one attribute of a complex product.
More recent work has focused on equilibrium in markets when consumers exhibit
some degree of trade-off aversion and employ some heuristic (e.g., Bachi and
Spiegler, 2015; Papi, 2014). In particular, Bachi and Spiegler (2015) study two-
attribute goods and assume that a dominant alternative is chosen when it exists.
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unavailable for choice) dominates one alternative (the target) but
not the other (non-target). The effect is present when the target’s
choice share is higher than the non-target’s. MADS predicts the
effect when the decoy changes the sampling distribution over the
product space in such a way that the density in the target’s solo-
dominance region increases by more than the density in the non-
target’s solo-dominance region. As the decoy is typically close to
the target, we consider it plausible that this area of the sampling
distribution would be inflated, leading to an increase in the choice
share of the target relative to the non-target. Secondly, more dis-
tant decoys may lead to larger context effects (e.g., Soltani, De
Martino, & Camerer, 2012). For the case of the attraction effect,
consider moving TB in Fig. 3 (right panel) further away from the
target, B (but such that TB is still dominated only by B). MADS
will predict a stronger attraction effect with this more distant
decoy if the sampling distribution becomes further stretched out
(as a result of the decoy becoming more distant) and hence more
densitymoves into B’s solo-dominance region. Thismovementwill
increase the probability of B being chosen and hence strengthen
the attraction effect. Thirdly, Teppan and Felfernig (2009) find that
the attraction effect can be offset by introducing twodecoys (rather
than one) to a binary choice set A, B, one dominated by A only,
one by B only. MADS naturally predicts this to happen: the sam-
pling distribution would plausibly be pulled down approximately
equally by both decoys, giving A and B a more equal share of the
density in their solo-dominance regions compared to a less equal
share following an attraction effect choice set, when only one of
these decoys is present.
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Appendix
Let A and B denote the sampling distributions given choice
sets F{A,B,TA} and F{A,B,TB} respectively. Also recall that we have
assumed i.i.d. draws from sampling distributions. The probability
of choosing x from X is denoted p(x|X). In equations, choice sets
are written without braces or commas to save on the width of the
text. To simplify the expressions, instead of using the sampling
distribution directly, we use the probability of a choice alternative
accumulating a point relative to other choice alternatives. These
are denotedα(x) andβ(x) given choice sets {A, B,DA} and {A, B,DB}
respectively. n > 0 is assumed, but in some instances n = 1 would
cause a summand to be invalid, in those cases, the sum is zero.
Proof of Proposition 1. First we define the probability of choice
alternatives A, B and neither accruing a point:
α(A) = A(A)+ 12A(A, B) β(A) = B(A)+ 12B(A, B)
α(B) = A(B)+ 12A(A, B) β(B) = B(B)+ 12B(A, B)
α0 = 1− α(A)− α(B) β0 = 1− β(A)− β(B).
These allow us to write:
p(A|ABTA) =12
⌊ n−12 ⌋∑
k=0
(
n
k, k+ 1, n− 2k− 1
)
α(A)kα(B)k+1αn−2k−10
+
n∑
k1=0
min{k1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, n− k1 − k2
)
× α(A)k1α(B)k2αn−k1−k20
p(A|ABTB) =12
⌊ n−12 ⌋∑
k=0
(
n
k, k+ 1, n− 2k− 1
)
β(B)kβ(A)k+1βn−2k−10
+
n∑
k1=2
min{k1−2,n−k1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, n− k1 − k2
)
× β(A)k1β(B)k2βn−k1−k20 .
Denote p and p¯ as a lower bound for p(A|ABTA) and an upper
bound for p(A|ABTB) respectively, hence p > p¯ H⇒ p(A|ABTA) >
p(A|ABTB), the attraction effect:
p =
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, n− k1 − k2
)
× α(A)k1α(B)k2 (1− α(A)− α(B))n−k1−k2
p¯ =
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, n− k1 − k2
)
× β(A)k1β(B)k2 (1− β(A)− β(B))n−k1−k2
so p > p¯ if for k1 > k2:
α(A)k1α(B)k2 (1− α(A)− α(B))n−k1−k2
> β(A)k1β(B)k2 (1− β(A)− β(B))n−k1−k2
and if A(A) = B(B), A(B) = B(A) and A(A, B) = B(A, B) this
simplifies to[
α(A)
α(B)
]k1−k2 [
=
[
β(B)
β(A)
]k1−k2]
> 1. (A.1)
Due to the symmetry conditions, repeating the procedure for
p(B|ABTB) and p(B|ABTA) gives the same expression. When in ad-
dition one lets α(A)
α(B)
[
= β(B)
β(A)
]
> 1, (A.1) is satisfied as k1 > k2. ■
Proof of Proposition 2.
α(A) = A(A)+ 12 (A(A, B)+ A(A, CA))+ 13A(A, B, CA)
β(A) = B(A)+ 12B(A, B)+ 13B(A, B, CB)
α(B) = A(B)+ 12A(A, B)+ 13A(A, B, CA)
β(B) = B(B)+ 12 (B(A, B)+ B(B, CB))+ 13B(A, B, CB)
α(CA) = A(CA)+ 12A(A, CA)+ 13A(A, B, CA)
β(CB) = B(CB)+ 12B(B, CB)+ 13B(A, B, CB)
α0 = 1− α(A)− α(B)− α(CA)
β0 = 1− β(A)− β(B)− β(CB).
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These allow us to write:
p(A|ABCA) = 13
⌊ n3 ⌋∑
k=0
(
n
k, k, k, n− 3k
)
α(A)kα(B)kα(CA)kαn−3k0
+ 1
2
⌊ n2 ⌋∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k1, k2, n− 2k1 − k2
)
× α(A)k1α(B)k1α(CA)k2αn−2k1−k20
+ 1
2
⌊ n2 ⌋∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, k1, n− 2k1 − k2
)
× α(A)k1α(B)k2α(CA)k1αn−2k1−k20
+
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
min{k1−1,n−k1−k2}∑
k3=0
(
n
k1, k2, k3, n− k1 − k2 − k3
)
× α(A)k1α(B)k2α(CA)k3αn−k1−k2−k30
p(A|ABCB) = 13
⌊ n3 ⌋∑
k=0
(
n
k, k, k, n− 3k
)
β(A)kβ(B)kβ(CB)kβn−3k0
+ 1
2
⌊ n2 ⌋∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k1, k2, n− 2k1 − k2
)
× β(A)k1β(B)k1β(CB)k2βn−2k1−k20
+ 1
2
⌊ n2 ⌋∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, k1, n− 2k1 − k2
)
× β(A)k1β(B)k2β(CB)k1βn−2k1−k20
+
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
min{k1−1,n−k1−k2}∑
k3=0
×
(
n
k1, k2, k3, n− k1 − k2 − k3
)
× β(A)k1β(B)k2β(CB)k3βn−k1−k2−k30 .
We make the following symmetry assumptions: A(A) = B(B),
A(B) = A(CA) = B(A) = B(CB), A(A, B) = A(A, CA) = B(A, B) =
B(B, CB) andA(A, B, CA) = B(A, B, CB). Together these implyα(A) =
β(B), α(B) = β(A), α(CA) = β(CB) and α0 = β0. Under these
assumptions, notice that p(A|ABCA) > p(A|ABCB) (the compromise
effect) is found if:[
α(A)
α(B)
]k1−k2 [
=
[
β(B)
β(A)
]k1−k2]
> 1. (A.2)
Due to the symmetry conditions, repeating the procedure for
p(B|ABCB) and p(B|ABCA) gives the same expression. Finally, by
symmetry,
A(A)+ 12A(A, B)+ 12A(A, CA)
B(A)+ 12B(A, B)
> 1 H⇒ α(A)
α(B)
> 1
H⇒ (A.2) holds as k1 > k2. ■
Proof of Proposition 3.
α(A) = A(A)+ 12A(A, SA)+ 13A(A, B, SA)
β(A) = B(A)+ 12B(A, SB)+ 13B(A, B, SB)
α(B) = A(B)+ 12A(B, SA)+ 13A(A, B, SA)
β(B) = B(B)+ 12B(B, SB)+ 13B(A, B, SB)
α(SA) = A(SA)+ 12 (A(A, SA)+ A(B, SA))+ 13A(A, B, SA)
β(SB) = B(SB)+ 12 (B(A, SB)+ B(B, SB))+ 13B(A, B, SB)
α0 = 1− α(A)− α(B)− α(SA)
β0 = 1− β(A)− β(B)− β(SA).
These allow us to write:
p(A|ABSA) = 13
⌊ n3 ⌋∑
k=0
(
n
k, k, k, n− 3k
)
α(A)kα(B)kα(SA)kαn−3k0
+ 1
2
⌊ n2 ⌋∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k1, k2, n− 2k1 − k2
)
× α(A)k1α(B)k1α(SA)k2αn−2k1−k20
+ 1
2
⌊ n2 ⌋∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, k1, n− 2k1 − k2
)
× α(A)k1α(B)k2α(SA)k1αn−2k1−k20
+
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
min{k1−1,n−k1−k2}∑
k3=0
×
(
n
k1, k2, k3, n− k1 − k2 − k3
)
× α(A)k1α(B)k2α(SA)k3αn−k1−k2−k30
p(A|ABSB) = 13
⌊ n3 ⌋∑
k=0
(
n
k, k, k, n− 3k
)
β(A)kβ(B)kβ(SB)kβn−3k0
+ 1
2
⌊ n2 ⌋∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k1, k2, n− 2k1 − k2
)
× β(A)k1β(B)k1β(SB)k2βn−2k1−k20
+ 1
2
⌊ n2 ⌋∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, k1, n− 2k1 − k2
)
× β(A)k1β(B)k2β(SB)k1βn−2k1−k20
+
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
min{k1−1,n−k1−k2}∑
k3=0
×
(
n
k1, k2, k3, n− k1 − k2 − k3
)
× β(A)k1β(B)k2β(SB)k3βn−k1−k2−k30 .
We make the following symmetry assumptions: A(A) = B(B),
A(B) = B(A), A(SA) = B(SB), A(A, SA) = B(B, SB), A(B, SA) =
B(A, SB) andA(A, B, SA) = B(A, B, SB). Together these imply α(A) =
β(B), α(B) = β(A), α(SA) = β(SB) and α0 = β0. Under these
assumptions, notice that p(A|ABSA) > p(A|ABSB) (the similarity
effect) is found if:[
α(A)
α(B)
]k1−k2 [
=
[
β(B)
β(A)
]k1−k2]
> 1. (A.3)
Due to the symmetry conditions, repeating the procedure for
p(B|ABSB) and p(B|ABSA) gives the same expression. Finally, by
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symmetry,
A(A)+ 12A(A, SA)
B(A)+ 12B(A, SB)
> 1 H⇒ α(A)
α(B)
> 1
H⇒ (A.3) holds as k1 > k2. ■
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